Little is known about how firms manage cash policy over time and the resulting dynamics of cash. This gap in our understanding occurs because the previous research focuses on the cross sectional determinants of cash. In this paper, we fill this gap by examining if and how firms manage cash toward a target cash ratio. Estimating partial adjustment models of cash, we find that firms actively adjust their cash toward a target; however, the speed of adjustment is slow and there is large dispersion in the speed of adjustment across firms. We investigate the causes for this, and find evidence consistent with the presence of adjustment costs. We also show that better corporate governance and access to a line of credit increase the speed of adjustment. Surprisingly, we do not find a significant relation between the speed of adjustment of cash and of capital structure. We also examine the implications these results have on previous interpretations of cross-sectional results. To do this, we simulate firms' cash paths allowing for costly adjustment and find that the emerging patterns question the interpretation of some of the standard results in the empirical cash literature. Overall, these results provide insight into the dynamics of cash policy, filling an important gap in the existing literature, and expand our understanding of existing motives for holding cash.
Introduction
A large literature examines the cross-sectional determinants of cash. However, little is understood about how firms manage their cash because there is virtually no empirical work on the time-series dynamics of corporate cash management. This paper attempts to fill this gap by studying the speed of adjustment (SOA) of corporate cash toward its target, the properties and determinants of the SOA of cash, and the implications of the emerging dynamics for the interpretation of previous empirical findings in the cash literature. Our results are compelling and suggest that firms only slowly rebalance their cash holdings, consistent with the presence of adjustment costs. We further illustrate that there is substantial firm-level heterogeneity in the SOA of cash and examine what factors explain differences in firms' SOA. We then investigate the importance of infrequent adjustment to the current interpretation of cross-sectional results in the cash literature and find evidence that calls into question results consistent with the precautionary motive for holding cash. This paper is the first to examine adjustment costs of rebalancing cash and in doing so contributes not only to our understanding of the dynamics of cash but also to what is generally accepted as the primary drivers of cash policy, namely the precautionary motive.
We begin by examining the evolution of firms' cash ratios over time. To do this, firms are sorted on unexpected cash, relative to the empirical model of cash in Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009) , into four portfolios: Very high, High, Medium, and Low. Their unexpected cash positions are then tracked over the subsequent 20 years. This method is similar to the approach in Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008) , applied to cash ratios instead of capital structure. Figure 1 presents the results. Two main patterns emerge: (i) Firms slowly adjust their cash towards a target cash ratio, and (ii) There is some persistence in cash ratios, albeit less than the documented persistence in capital structure: In contrast to capital structure, the differences between the unexpected cash portfolios become insignificant after 16 years. Because the ratios converge toward a target, we conclude that the extant determinants of cash holdings are able to explain cross-sectional differences in cash across firms. However, it is clear that firms do not fully adjust in any one period and there is a substantial, unexplored transitory component of cash holdings that has been largely ignored by the existing literature on cash holdings. The goal of this paper is to understand the causes and consequences of this slow adjustment to the target cash ratio.
To study the speed of adjustment of cash, we calculate the pooled annual speed of adjustment (SOA), i.e. the rate at which firms revert back to their target cash ratio. A SOA of 1 implies perfect, continuous adjustment, whereas a SOA of 0 implies perfect non-readjustment. Because there is an ongoing debate in the literature about the proper estimation procedure of SOA (e.g., Iliev and Welch (2009) ), we employ a wide battery of SOA estimators.
1 . We estimate the annual SOA of cash to lie between 0.2 and 0.4, suggesting that cash is slowly adjusted toward its target.
Slow SOA might indicate that either firms do not actively manage their cash or firms do rebalance their cash holdings, albeit infrequently, due to adjustment costs. To distinguish between these two alternatives, we investigate whether or not firms actively manage their cash balances. We find that financing, in the form of large net debt and equity issues, as well as stock repurchases, is associated with higher speeds of adjustments. We also show that large investments push firms towards their target cash ratio, suggesting that firms build cash reserves in anticipation of future, substantial investments. Taken together, these results suggest that firms actively manage their cash reserves. The natural question that arises is: why do we observe slow readjustment?
To answer this question, we test how the firm's cash position relative to its target affects its cash rebalancing. We find that firms that are below their target exhibit significantly lower SOA's. This result is consistent with higher, asymmetric adjustment costs of building cash reserves relative to disgorging cash. We also find that firms that are further away from their target readjust cash holdings more rapidly, consistent with lower marginal adjustment costs (relative to the marginal benefits) when further away from the target.
To further determine the impact adjustment costs, we build on the insight in Faulkender et al.
(2009) and seek out cross sectional differences in adjustment costs. We hypothesize that firms with significantly negative or very high free cash flows (FCF) should have low adjustment costs and thus higher speeds of adjustment, relative to those around the median free cash flow. Those with significantly negative free cash flow have low adjustment costs because they must raise external capital or use cash to cover their financing deficit. Symmetrically, firms with large positive free cash flows are most likely to be distributing excess capital or retain cash to move toward their target cash. On the other hand, firms with free cash flows close to zero will confront the largest incremental costs and thus will have slow speeds of adjustment. We identify firms with large (positive or negative) free cash flows, which are likely to confront a relatively low marginal cost of adjustment and, hence, should manifest relatively rapid adjustment speeds.
We expect that when we estimate the SOA separately across these three groups, we should find higher adjustment speeds for those firms whose incremental adjustment costs are lower. Our results indeed reveal a U-Shape relation between the SOA of cash and FCF: SOA is significantly higher for firms with low/high FCF. We therefore conclude that adjustment costs are an important determinant of how a firm manages its cash balances.
In addition to examining how adjustment costs impact SOA, we also examine other variables that are important to cash policy and find that that there is substantial cross-sectional dispersion in cash SOA across firms. Specifically, we investigate the determinants of the cross-sectional variation and find that access to a bank line of credit significantly increases the SOA of cash. We also find that better governance is associated with more rapid SOA, implying that cash rebalancing is efficient. Surprisingly, we do not find any evidence that links between the SOA of capital structure and the SOA of cash. Thus, it does not seem to be the case that firms that rebalance their capital structure more rapidly are also the firms that rebalance their cash holdings more quickly.
In a final step, we examine the implications of costly adjustment for previous findings in the cash literature. As shown in the capital structure literature (e.g., Leary and Roberts (2005) , Strebulaev (2007) ), the presence of adjustment costs might hamper the interpretation of some of the conclusions drawn based from cross sectional patterns. To investigate this idea, we simulate corporate cash paths allowing for costly adjustment. In the simulation, all firms are endowed with the same level of target cash. We then let their cash holdings mechanically fluctuate with random draws of cash flows and capital expenditures, unless they hit the cash lower or upper bounds, in which case they revert to their target. We vary the interval between the lower and upper bound to test the implications of lower adjustment costs (smaller intervals) versus higher adjustment costs (larger intervals).
We conjecture that firms with larger cash flow shocks will hold more cash in the presence of costly adjustment because firms will take longer to rebalance cash back to its target given the adjustment costs. Similarly, firms with larger capital expenditure shocks will hold less cash in the presence of costly adjustment. Since larger shocks to cash flow (capital expenditures) will cause higher volatility in cash flow (capital expenditures), a mechanical relation between volatility in cash flow/capital expenditure and cash holdings will exist that would not exist without adjustment costs. We find evidence consistent with our hypotheses: There is no relation between cash holdings and cash flow/capital expenditure volatility when adjustment costs are low, and a significant relation between them when adjustment costs are high. However, this relation is not economically meaningful. All simulated cash paths correspond to the same target cash level, irrespective of cash flow/capital expenditure volatility. Thus, these findings cast doubt on the standard interpretation of the empirically-observed relation between cash and volatility and suggest that we might need to rethink our tests of cash holdings in the presence of costly adjustment. Given that volatility is the primary driver of the aggregate increase in cash, documented by Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009) , this result is particularly interesting.
Our paper adds to prior literature in a number of important ways. First, it argues that the dynamic, time-series dimension of cash management should not be overlooked in favor of crosssectional tests, which have been the focus of the previous literature (e.g., Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999) , Almeida, Campbello, and Weisbach (2004) , Faulkender and Wang (2006) ). Second, it suggests that costly adjustment plays an important role in liquidity policies.
The role of adjustment costs has been emphasized in the context of other financial policies, such as investment and capital structure (e.g., Hennessy and Whited (2005) , Zhang (2005), Strebulaev (2007)), but has not received attention in the cash literature. Finally, this paper shows that costly adjustment has implications for how we interpret standard results in the cash literature and calls into question some of the empirical findings in previous studies.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section I describes the data and our sample construction.
Section II examines the properties of the rebalancing of cash holdings. Section III investigates whether firms actively rebalance their cash holdings. Section IV explores the presence of adjustment costs, while Section V studies the cross sectional determinants of SOA. Section VI studies the implications of costly adjustment through simulations, and Section VII concludes.
I. Data
Our sample consists of annual data on publicly traded firms available on Standard and Poor's
Compustat. The sample period starts in 1965 and ends in 2006, before the beginning of the 2007 credit crisis. We stop before the beginning of the crisis because recent evidence suggests that cash reserves played an important role in firms' operating performance during the crisis and thus including this period may alter our results (Duchin, Ozbas, and Sensoy (2009) ).
We exclude financial firms and utilities, defined as firms with SIC codes between 6000-6999 and 4900-4949, respectively. For the relatively few firms that change their fiscal year during our sample period, we keep the most recent fiscal year convention. Because our analysis relies on the estimation of cash rebalancing over the sample period, we restrict attention to firms with available data on cash and short-term investments for at least 15 years. 2 Our final sample consists of 106,091 annual observations for 4,285 firms.
Variables are defined in Appendix 1. We winsorize all variables, except Tobin's Q, at the 1 st and 99 th percentiles to lessen the influence of outliers. Tobin's Q is computed as in Kaplan and Zingales (1997) with an upper bound of 10, following Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003) . Table 1 provides summary statistics for the variables employed in this study. Average cash flow is 8.0% of book assets, whereas average capital expenditures are 7.2% of book assets.
In both cases, the cross sectional variation suggests there is a substantial degree of heterogeneity 2 We obtain similar results if we remove this restriction and include firms with fewer than 15 observations. across firms. Also, the average firm has outstanding short-term (long-term) debt of 6.0% (20.0%) of book assets, a deficit of 5.8% of book assets, and Tobin's Q that is greater than one.
II. Rebalancing of Cash Holdings
We begin by examining the evolution of firms' cash ratios over time. To do this, firms are sorted on unexpected cash, relative to the empirical model of cash in Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009) , into four portfolios: Very high, High, Medium, and Low. Their unexpected cash positions are then tracked over the subsequent 20 years. This method is similar to the approach in Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008) , applied to cash ratios instead of capital structure. Figure 1 presents the results. Figure 1 suggests that there is significant convergence among the four portfolios' cash averages over time. After 16 years, the differences between the unexpected cash portfolios become insignificant. Yet, convergence is slow, and a significant portion of it occurs in the first few years after the formation period, as evidenced by the flattening slope over time in the Low and Very High portfolios. Therefore, a preliminary examination of cash ratios suggests that the previously identified cross-sectional determinants of cash, used by Bates, Kahle and Stulz (2009) and others, explain the heterogeneity of cash ratios across firms. Nevertheless, Figure 1 suggests the presence of a transitory or short run component in cash ratios. This component received virtually no attention in previous studies of firms' cash policies, and is the focus of this paper.
Thus, we start our empirical investigation by estimating the pooled speed of adjustment (SOA) of the firms in our sample.
To calculate the SOA of cash ratios, we estimate a target adjustment model, in which cash adjusts over time to a target. This section offers a comprehensive treatment of the target adjustment properties of cash. We consider various measures of cash and different target adjustment estimation procedures, building on the voluminous body of research on capital structure rebalancing. Table 2 presents the properties of the cash measures used in our paper and the Appendix summarizes the definitions of each variable. The primary measure we use is cash divided by book assets. Table 2 shows that the cash-to-assets ratio has a pooled mean of 10.4%, a pooled standard deviation of 13.3%, and an average cross-sectional standard deviation of 12.5%. The median is at 5.5%, suggesting that the distribution of cash is right-skewed. We consider 2 alternative measures. The most common alternative measure is the cash-to-net-book-assets ratio, where net book assets are defined as book assets excluding cash. Table 2 shows that it has a pooled mean of 17.0%, a pooled median of 5.8%, a pooled standard deviation of 43.8%, and an average cross-sectional standard deviation of 38.5%. This suggests that the cash-to-net-assets ratio is also skewed to the right. Another possibility is to normalize cash by market, instead of book, values. As Table 2 shows, cash-to-market value has a lower pooled mean (7.8%) and lower pooled and cross-sectional standard deviations (9.6% and 9.0%, respectively). Based on the median of 4.6%, this measure is also skewed to the right. Taggart (1977) and Auerbach (1985) . In their general form, applied to cash, these models are given by:
where the target-adjustment coefficient is greater than zero if firms adjust towards the target, and it is strictly less than one if there exist some positive adjustment costs. and * denote, respectively, the cash ratio and the target at t. The expression * is called the "deviation from the target". Rearranging Eq. (1) yields:
We consider 4 different estimators of the speed of adjustment (SOA) of cash ratios. The first, which we call OLS, is a pooled OLS regression, in which cash is regressed on past cash, and a set of control variables similar to the ones employed in Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009) , which include lagged cash flow, industry cash flow volatility, Tobin's Q, capital expenditure, debt, a dividend dummy, firm size, net working capital (excluding cash), R&D expenditures, and acquisitions:
where is the vector of control variables. This procedure resembles the procedure to estimate target capital structure in Fama and French (2002) and Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008) . Flannery and Rangan (2006) suggest adding fixed effects into the estimator to control for omitted variables that might drive the heterogeneity across firms' targets. We call this model FE, and estimate it as follows:
However, one potential problem with the FE estimator is that the fixed effects consume a large number of degrees of freedom. As discussed in Huang and Ritter (2009) and Iliev and Welch (2009) , the loss of degrees of freedom may lead to the 'Hurwicz bias', implying meanreversion even when there is not one. This bias arises in small samples, with few firms and time periods, where the lagged residuals and the independent variables are not orthogonal. In our context, a large error term in period t will create a large independent variable in period t+1, thus violating the orthogonality assumption. While this bias is not important for the OLS estimator (Eq. (3)) because our sample is large, with many more firms than time periods, it reappears with the FE estimator (Eq. (4)) because the intercepts assume the mean error realizations. One possible solution is to use the GMM procedure in Blundell and Bond (1998) , as implemented by Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008) . Table 3 reports this estimator in the GMM column. This estimator is estimated from the following equation using iterated two-stage least squares (2SLS) with lagged residuals as instruments:
The LD estimator requires a long time-series and can be estimated with different length periods.
As can be seen from Eq. (5), we focus our attention to overlapping 7 years, but the results are similar if we use other time lengths. suggesting that the speed of adjustment of cash ratios is relatively slow, especially since these estimates tend to be upward biased, as discussed by Iliev and Welch (2009) .
One way to gain intuition into the meaning of these SOA estimates is to translate them into "half-lives". The SOA is the expected percentage by which the gap between the past cash and the target closes in one period. Half-life is the time that it takes a firm to adjust one-half the distance to its target cash after a one unit shock to the error term. For an AR(1) process, half life is log(0.5)/log(1-SOA). Thus, focusing on cash as fraction of book assets, the OLS estimate indicates a half life of 2.8 years, whereas the GMM estimator indicates a half life of 1.6 years.
Our results clearly suggest less than perfect and continuous adjustment to the target. These results can occur for three reasons: 1) Firms do not have a target cash ratio and therefore do not manage their cash holdings towards it; 2) Firms have a target cash ratio but the target model is misspecified; or 3) Firms have a target cash ratio and they do manage cash towards the taret, but there are costs to adjust their cash ratios. These costs may arise due to the cost of raising cash through financing or due to the cost of distributing cash through a dividend or stock repurchase.
These three conflicting views have very different implications. If firms do not have a target cash ratio, then we would not expect them to actively manage their cash ratios towards their targets through financing activities, investment policies, and distributions to shareholders. If firms do have target cash rations, but they slowly adjust their cash towards the target due to the presence of adjustment costs, then we would expect the speed of adjustment to vary across firms based on the adjustment costs they face. Lastly, if the model we are using for target cash levels is misspecified, then we would not expect firms to rebalance or converge to that target even slowly.
Nevertheless, the evidence presented in Figure 1 suggests that firms do rebalance towards the target cash ratios implied by the empirical model in Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009) that we use in this paper. In fact, the differences between our Low and Very High unexpected cash portfolios disappear completely in 16 years. Thus, we conclude that the empirical model of target cash we use does capture the target cash ratios, and devote the next two sections to the investigation of active cash management (Section III) and adjustment costs (Section IV).
III. Active Management of Cash
Figure 1 illustrates that cash ratios converge significantly, albeit slowly, towards more moderate cash ratios. The estimation of partial adjustment models, as reported in Table 3 , further indicates that the pooled SOA of cash ratios towards a target is slow. Thus, one alternative is that firms actively but slowly manage their cash ratios to maintain a target level of cash. Another alternative is that firms do not actively manage their cash holdings towards a target, and that one should not necessarily equate mean-reversion with active cash management.
To distinguish between these two possibilities, we start by examining the relation between the SOA of cash ratios and the underlying dynamics of actual cash ratios vis-à-vis the dynamics of the implied target cash ratio. Using Eq. (6b), we create a dummy variable equal to 1 if more than 50% of the change in unexpected cash from year t-1 to t is due to the change in cash and equal to 0 if 50% or more of the change is due to the change in the target cash ratio. We refer to this variable as Active, defined formally as: * * (6c)
The summary statistics for Active are given in Table 2 . They indicate that changes in unexpected cash are due to changes in cash rather than changes in the target in 55.4% of the observations. This indicates that firms experience dramatic changes in both their target cash ratios and their actual cash ratios.
Panel A of Table 4 reports the results of estimating the OLS pooled SOA of cash ratios in subsamples sorted on Active. 6 Our conjecture is that if companies actively manage their cash holdings, the SOA of cash should be significantly higher when Active=1. The evidence presented in Panel A is consistent with our conjecture. For all three measures of cash ratios, the SOA of cash is significantly higher when Active=1, that is, when most of the change in unexpected cash is due to changes in actual cash rather than in the implied target cash ratio. Thus, the preliminary evidence suggests that changes in cash, rather than in implied target ratios, lead to substantially faster rebalancing of cash, consistent with firms actively changing their actual cash ratios towards a target.
In the remainder of this section, we consider three channels through which firms might actively manage their cash ratios to maintain a target ratio. In Panel B of Table 4 , we examine the correlation between investment, as measured by scaled capital expenditure, and the SOA of cash ratios. Each year t, we divide the sample into below-median and above-median capital expenditures, and estimate the SOA of cash from year t-1 to t. If firms actively manage their cash ratios towards a target, and adjust their cash reserves to accommodate future investment needs, we would observe more rapid cash rebalancing once investments materialize. The evidence in Panel B suggests that this is indeed the case. The SOA of cash is significantly higher when firms make substantial investments. For instance, the SOA coefficient on our cash-to-assets ratio is 0.23 when firms do not make significant investments, and is 0.31 when they do make such investment (i.e., an increase of 35% in SOA). As panel B shows, the results are similar for the two other measures of cash ratios.
Another way of managing cash ratios is issuing debt and equity to raise capital. If firms were actively managing cash, they would do so when their cash ratios lie below the target.
Alternatively, if they were not actively managing their cash ratios, they would issue debt and equity irrespective of whether they are below or above their target cash level. To examine these alternatives, we divide our sample into firms that made and did not make significant net debt and equity issues (defined as issues with values of at least 5% of book assets, see the Appendix for variable definitions) each year t, and compare the SOA of cash across these two groups from year t-1 to year t. These results are given in Panel C of Table 4 . As Panel C clearly shows, the SOA of large net debt and equity issuers is significantly higher compared to that of non-issuers.
For example, the SOA of cash/book assets is 0.20 for non-issuers and 0.33 issuers (i.e., an increase of 65% in SOA). As can be seen from Panel C, we obtain similar results when we scale cash by net book assets or the market value of assets.
Finally, the firm can also actively manage its cash ratios by distributing cash to shareholders if its cash ratio is above the target. Given that dividends are relatively smooth over time, we focus our attention on share repurchases, which have become increasingly important in more recent years as the primary payout method. We examine the stock repurchasing activity of firms in the four unexpected cash portfolios described earlier. The results are presented in Figure   2 . 7 We find that the tendency to repurchase shares noticeably differs across the portfolios. The propensity to repurchase shares is monotonically positively related to firms' unexpected cash ratios. This tendency is stronger in earlier years, consistent with Figure 1 , which shows that much of the convergence in cash ratios is achieved during the first few years, but does persist in later years as well. This finding suggests that an important motivation behind share repurchase policy is cash rebalancing. It also helps identify the mechanism behind the initial convergence of cash ratios observed in Figure 1 .
Overall, the findings in this section present evidence consistent with active cash management toward a target ratio. Thus, it suggests that the slow pooled SOA of cash ratios found in section II is not due to firms not having target cash ratios and therefore not managing their cash towards a target. In the next section, we consider another possible explanation for the slow rebalancing of cash ratios that is consistent with active cash management towards a target, namely the presence of adjustment costs.
IV. Adjustment Costs
The results in the previous section suggest that firms actively manage their cash policies towards a target cash ratio. Formally, Positive Xcash is defined as:
The purpose of this variable is to test whether the SOA of cash is different when firms' cash ratios are above vs. below the target. The adjustment costs hypothesis would imply that SOA is asymmetrically slower below the target, as adjustment costs are higher below the target cash ratio due to financing constraints and the costs of external financing.
Second, we create a dummy variable equal to 1 if the absolute difference between the firm's cash ratio and its implied target ratio is greater than the sample-wide median in each year t, and zero otherwise. We refer to this variable as Away from target. Formally, this variable equals is defined as: * *
This variable is designed to test whether firms that are further away from their target tend to rebalance their cash ratios more rapidly. Such a finding would be consistent with the presence of fixed adjustment costs, which would make it optimal to rebalance only when sufficiently far away from the target, when the costs of being away from the target are high enough.
Panel A of Table 2 presents summary statistics of these variables and Panel B of Table 2 presents the correlations between the various measures. The summary statistics for Positive
Unexpected Cash indicate that approximately 60% of the observations correspond to cash ratios that lie below the target. The vast majority of the literature on corporate liquidity focuses on positive unexpected cash in the context of agency concerns. Little is known about the implications of holding less cash than the target and this paper is therefore one of the first to distinguish firms based on having negative unexpected cash. Table 2 also shows that the average absolute unexpected cash, that is, the average absolute deviation from the target ratio, is 7.3% of book assets. Given that the mean cash ratio in our sample is 10.4%, the average deviation is large.
Panel A of Table 5 presents the results of estimating OLS pooled SOA's of cash ratios separately for firms with positive unexpected cash and negative unexpected cash. The results suggest that cash rebalancing is faster when firms' cash ratios are above their implied target ratios. The difference persists across all three measures of cash ratios, and is of substantial magnitudes. This finding is consistent with the presence of asymmetrically higher adjustment costs when firms are below their target ratio, consistent with the presence of financing frictions and constraints.
In Panel B, we estimate cash SOA separately when the absolute difference between actual cash ratios and implied target ratios lie below and above the median. Again, consistent with the presence of fixed adjustment costs, we find that the SOA of cash is substantially higher when further away from the target across all three measures of cash ratios. Taken together, the results in Table 5 are consistent with the presence of asymmetric, fixed adjustment costs that cause firms to optimally rebalance cash ratios infrequently.
To further explore whether there is evidence consistent with the presence of adjustment costs, we build on the insight in Faulkender et al. (2009) , and try to find cross sectional differences in adjustment costs. We identify firms with large (positive or negative) free cash flows, which are likely to confront a relatively low marginal cost of adjustment and, hence, should manifest relatively rapid adjustment speeds. Specifically, we hypothesize that firms with significantly negative free cash flows should have low adjustment costs because they must raise external capital or use cash to cover their financing deficit. Symmetrically, firms with large positive free cash flows are most likely to be distributing excess capital or retain cash to move toward their target cash. Paying dividends or repurchasing shares will decrease cash, while retaining free cash flow will increase cash. On the other hand, firms with free cash flows close to zero will confront the largest incremental costs. We therefore would expect that when we estimate the SOA separately across these three groups, we would find higher adjustment speeds for those firms whose incremental adjustment costs are lower. Consistent with the adjustment costs hypothesis, the results in Table 6 reveal a U-Shape relation between the SOA of cash ratios and free cash flows, consistent across all three measures of cash ratios. SOA is significantly higher for firms with low/high FCF relative to medium FCF.
Consider, for example, the cash-to-assets ratio in Panel A. The estimated SOA is 0.27 when FCF is high, 0.23 when FCF is low, and 0.19 for medium level of FCF. Thus, we conclude that firms tend to rebalance cash ratios more rapidly when free cash flows are particularly low or high, and therefore the incremental costs of rebalancing trough cash flow retention, payout, or external capital raising, are particularly low.
Taken together, the results in this section are consistent with the presence of adjustment costs in the management of cash policies towards target ratios. These findings are consistent with our previous findings that companies actively manage their cash ratios towards a target, albeit slowly. In the next section, we further investigate the cross-section of cash SOA, focusing on the relation between cash and three corporate dimensions that received significant attention in the cash literature, namely corporate governance, bank lines of credit, and leverage.
V. Cross-sectional Differences in Cash Rebalancing
There is substantial cross-sectional dispersion in the speed of adjustment of cash across firms. This is evident in Figure 3 , which presents the distribution of cash SOA across firms, where the SOA is estimated by firm. 8 In this section, we focus on the cross section of SOA, and test whether corporate governance, bank lines of credit, and leverage, three areas that were studied extensively in the context of cash holdings (e.g., Acharya, Almeida, and Campello (2007) In doing so, we add to previous literature that mainly considered the connection between the level and value of corporate cash holdings and corporate governance, bank lines of credit, and leverage. Nevertheless, it is of interest to examine whether each of these dimensions is related to the speed at which firms rebalance their cash holdings to their target level.
Specifically, we ask whether better governed firms, which have been shown to waste less cash than poorly governed firms, also rebalance their cash ratio more rapidly toward their target level. While interesting in itself, this approach also has the advantage of allowing cash to be above or below the target, whereas previous studies have largely concentrated on the relation between positive "excess" cash, or having too much cash, and corporate governance.
To test the relation between corporate governance and the SOA of cash, we use multiple measures of internal and external corporate governance including the degree of managerial entrenchment due to takeover defenses and the presence of large shareholder monitoring. These governance measures are collectively examined in Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) Table 7 gives the results of our corporate governance tests, with each panel corresponding to a different governance measure. With all three measures, we find that the SOA is more rapid in well-governed firms compared to poorly-governed firms. The direction of the differences persists across measures of governance and cash ratios, though the magnitudes are not always significant. For example, the SOA of cash-to-assets for poorly governed firms is 0.20 when governance is measured by the g-index, 0.23 when it is measured by the percentage of shares held by institutional investors, and 0.23 when it is measured by the number of large block holders. The SOA for well governed firms, however, is 0.24 when governance is measured by the g-index, 0.28 when it is measured by the percentage of shares held by institutional investors, and 0.28 when it is measured by the number of large block holders. Taken together, these results suggest that well-governed firms not only waste less cash, but also rebalance their cash holdings towards their target more rapidly.
We also examine whether access to a bank line of credit is associated with a higher or a lower SOA of cash. One hypothesis would be that firms with access to a line of credit care less about their cash holdings because they have access to an alternative source of liquidity. This, in turn, will imply that the SOA of cash for such firms would be lower. An alternative hypothesis would be that access to a bank line of credit implies lower financing constraints and therefore lower adjustment costs of cash. Access to a line of credit could also imply that the firm is actively managing its liquidity needs through both cash and bank lines of credit. This hypothesis therefore implies that access to a bank line of credit would be associated with a more rapid SOA.
To test the relation between the SOA of cash and bank lines of credit, we collect data on revolving credit facilities from DealScan. For each firm-year in our sample, we document whether the firm had access to a revolving credit facility that year, and code a binary variable that equals 0 if the firm did not have access to a line of credit that year, and 1 if it did have access. Then, we estimate the SOA of cash separately when this variable equals 0 and when it equals 1. Table 8 reports these results. Across all three measures of cash ratios, access to a line of credit is associated with a more rapid SOA of cash. For example, the SOA of cash-to-assets ratios without access to a line of credit is 0.26, whereas the SOA with access to a line of credit is 0.32. These results are consistent the hypothesis that access to a bank line of credit implies lower financing constraints and therefore lower adjustment costs of cash, which make it optimal for the firm to rebalance its cash holdings more rapidly. It might also imply that access to a line of credit is indicative of actually actively maintaining a liquidity policy.
Another interesting question revolves around the relation between the management of capital structure and the management of cash holdings. The "Negative Debt" view of cash suggests that since cash balances are readily available to redeem debt, they should not be viewed as independent of leverage. Under this view, firms should be managing their cash and debt positions together, i.e., managing their net debt positions. This view would imply that the rebalancing of cash and debt is highly correlated and thus we would expect the SOA of cash to be highly correlated with the SOA of debt. An alternative view, put forth by Opler et al. (1999) and more recently by Acharya et al. (2007) , suggests that in the presence of financing frictions, cash plays a separate role and should therefore be managed and studied in its own right. Under this view, the rebalancing (SOA) of cash and debt should not necessarily be highly correlated, since firms will be managing their capital structure and cash policies separately. As Opler et al.
(1999) point out, however, the cross-sectional determinants of cash and debt are very similar, only with opposite signs. Previous literature did not consider, however, the relation between the dynamic rebalancing of the two, which might shed further light on the interaction between the two policies.
In Table 9 , we test the relation between the SOA of cash ratios and the SOA of leverage ratios. The SOA of debt is estimated by firm from an autoregressive OLS procedure similar to the one in Figure 3 , using the set of control variables in Byoun (2008), which includes industry median debt, the marginal tax rate, Q, operating income, depreciation and amortization, a dividend dummy, size, fixed assets, R&D expenses, and Altman's Z-score. We then divide the sample into two groups, consisting of firms with a SOA of debt below and above the medina debt SOA, respectively, and estimate the SOA of cash ratios separately in each subsample.
The results in Table 9 reveal no significant relation between the SOA of cash and the SOA of leverage. Across all three measures of cash ratios, the difference between the SOA of cash for the two subsamples is negligible. For example, the SOA of cash-to-assets is 0.258 for firms with low SOA of debt, and 0.254 for firms with high SOA of debt. Thus, not only is the difference small, the SOA is actually higher for firms with slower SOA of debt. Additionally, the direction of the differences is not consistent across the three cash measures, with the relation using the cash-to-net-assets and the cash-to-market-assets ratios being opposite of the relation using cash-to-assets. These results suggest that cash management is not simply an artifact of capital structure management since the dynamic rebalancing of cash does not coincide with that of leverage. This line of investigation builds on recent developments in the research on the costly adjustment of leverage. Leary and Roberts (2005) , for example, show that the persistent effect of shocks on leverage is consistent with optimizing behavior in the presence of adjustment costs and is not necessarily due to firms' indifference towards capital structure. Strebulaev (2007) shows that cross-sectional patterns that commonly lead to the rejection of a dynamic tradeoff model of capital structure are actually consistent with such a model. In both papers, simulated capital structure paths that allow for costly adjustment are used to demonstrate the implications of adjustment costs.
VI. Implications of Costly Adjustment
This paper uses a similar approach. Specifically, we simulate corporate cash paths allowing for costly adjustment. Each firm is endowed at time 0 with the same target level of cash, Cash*, set equal to 15% of book assets. In each subsequent period, cash flows and capital expenditures arrive randomly. To keep the simulation as realistic as possible, we maintain the same universe of industry-firms observed empirically. Each firm in our empirical sample has a simulated counterpart in the same industry, with cash flows and capital expenditures generated randomly to match the distribution of cash flows and capital expenditures. Then, given the timeseries of cash flows and capital expenditures, we simulate cash paths. In our simulation, firms let their cash holdings fluctuate mechanically with cash flows and capital expenditures as long as cash holdings lie within an optimal range. Thus, as long as cash holdings lie within an optimal range, the cash holdings in period t+1 are given by:
However, if the stream of cash flows and capital expenditures result in a cash ratio below the lower bound (above the upper bound) in period t, the firm calculates the amount of cash it needs to accumulate (dispense) in order to bring the cash ratio to its target post-adjustment level. The rebalancing takes place in the beginning of period t+1, according to *
which takes into account the firm's expected cash flow and capital expenditure in period t+1.
We repeat this procedure for each firm in our sample, allowing for different degrees of We conjecture that firms with larger cash flow shocks, whose cash flows are therefore more volatile, will hold more cash in the presence of costly adjustment because costly adjustment keeps the firm from rebalancing. Similarly, firms with larger capital expenditure shocks, whose capital expenditures are more volatile, will hold less cash in the presence of costly adjustment. This will generate a mechanical relation between volatility in cash flow/capital expenditure and cash holdings that would not exist without adjustment costs. Without costly adjustment, firms' cash balances will frequently rebalance back to their target and therefore will not sustain a durable effect of cash flow/capital expenditure shocks. The results in Table 10 are striking and consistent with our hypotheses. In both panels, there is very little persistent shock effect to cash flow and capital expenditure without adjustment costs; and therefore, the relation between cash ratios and the volatility in cash flow or in capital expenditure is very small. However, once the simulation allows for costly adjustment, the simulated data yields a substantial positive relation between cash flow volatility and cash, and a substantial negative relation between capital expenditure volatility and cash. These effects are statistically significant at the 1 percent level and are qualitatively similar to the relation between cash and cash flow volatility or cash and capital expenditure volatility that we observe in the real-world data. Moreover, the effects strengthen considerably when the speed of adjustment (SOA) is lower. In both panels, the magnitude of the volatility effect on cash increases substantially when the implied SOA decreases from 0.87 to 0.45.
The positive cross-sectional relation between cash and cash flow volatility is typically interpreted as consistent with the precautionary savings motive, which suggests that riskier firms should hold more cash. In contrast, our simulated result is purely mechanical. All simulated firms are assumed to have an identical target level of cash, which is unrelated to their cash flow volatility. Thus, the simulated positive relation between cash and cash flow volatility is a consequence of persistent cash flow shocks and infrequent rebalancing rather than a result of higher precautionary saving needs.
Further, we also find that both in real-world data and in simulations with costly adjustment, the volatility of capital expenditure is negatively related to cash. This result is surprising in the context of the precautionary savings theory, as higher volatility in expenditures (or investment) is predicted to imply higher cash reserves similar to the effect of higher cash flow volatility. To our knowledge, the negative relation between capital expenditure volatility and cash has not been previously shown. This relation is consistent with costly adjustment, but inconsistent with the common view of precautionary savings.
Overall, these findings cast doubt on the interpretation of the standard results in the cash literature. The results suggest that cross-sectional relations between cash and cash flow volatility or capital expenditure volatility are not necessarily indicative of a precautionary saving motive and, in fact, might even be inconsistent with such a story. In contrast, our results show that these relations are consistent with, and mechanically driven by, adjustment costs. Furthermore, given that volatility is the primary driver of the aggregate increase in cash, documented by Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009) , these results are particularly interesting.
VII. Conclusion
What are the time-series dynamics of cash holdings? In this paper, we investigate this question by examining how firms manage cash reserves over time. We find evidence consistent with active, albeit slow, cash rebalancing due to costly adjustment. To show this, we estimate the speed of adjustment of the cash ratio to the target. In doing so, this paper is the first to apply the importance of costly adjustment to the cash literature. Given the importance of adjustment costs in other financial policies (such as leverage and investment), it is only natural that these costs would also impact cash policy.
Using a battery of estimation procedures and a wide range of cash ratio measures, we find that the rebalancing of cash is imperfect, with speeds of adjustment ranging from 0.22 to 0.43 (where 0 implies perfect non-readjustment and 1 implies perfect adjustment). Slow rebalancing might be consistent with firms either not managing their cash to maintain a target ratio, or slowly managing it due to adjustment costs. To distinguish between these two alternatives, we test whether firms actively manage cash ratios through financing, investment, and payout activities and find that such activities are indeed associated with higher speeds of adjustment. We then examine whether the patterns of cash rebalancing are consistent with the presence of adjustment costs and find that rebalancing is slower exactly when cost of adjustment are expected to be higher. We therefore conclude that firms do manage their cash ratios but do so slowly in the presence of adjustment costs.
We also find that there is much cross-sectional variation in the speed of adjustment. We examine what factors influence a firm's speed of adjustment. We find that firms with slower adjustment have poorer corporate governance and do not have access to a line of credit.
Interestingly, though, we find no correlation between the SOA of cash and the rebalancing of capital structure. Unexpected Cash for Firm i is defined as the difference between its implied target cash ratio and its actual cash ratio.
Active is an indicator variable that equals 1 if more than 50% of the change in unexpected cash from year t-1 to year t is due to the change in cash, and 0 if 50% of the change or more is due to the change in target cash.
Positive unexpected cash is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm had positive unexpected cash at year t, and 0 otherwise.
Away from target is an indicator variable that equals 0 if the absolute value of unexpected cash is lower than the median absolute unexpected cash, and 1 if it is greater than the median.
Estimates of Speeds of Adjustment of Cash (SOA)
OLS procedure resembles the procedure to estimate target capital structure in Fama and French (2002) and Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008) , and is defined as follows (i denotes firm i and t denotes year t):
FE procedure resembles the procedure in Flannery and Rangan (2006) , and is defined as follows:
GMM procedure is similar to the model in Blundell and Bond (1998) , implemented by Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008) .
LD (long differencing) estimator is similar to the one proposed by Hahn, Hausman, and Kuersteiner (2007) and implemented by Huang and Ritter (2009) using 2SLS:
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Firm Characteristic Variables:
Cash Flow is measured as earnings less interest and taxes (ibq+dpq), divided by total assets (atq).
CAPEX is capital expenditure (capxy, translated into quarterly figures) divided by total assets (atq).
STDebt and LTDebt are short-term debt (dlcq) and long-term debt (dlttq) divided by total assets (atq), respectively.
Payout is defined as the sum of dividend payments (dvpq) and stock repurchases (prstkcyy, translated into quarterly figures), divided by book assets (atq).
Size is the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets (atq).
Net Equity Issues follows Baker and Wurgler (2002) , and is defined as the difference between the change in book equity (atq-ltq-pstkrq+txditcq) and the change in retained earnings (req).
Net Debt Issues is defined as difference between the change in book assets (atq) and the change in book equity (atqltq-pstkrq+txditcq).
Deficit is the difference between the change in book assets (atq) and the change in retained earnings (req).
CF Volatility is the industry-level volatility in cash flows over the past 40 quarters.
ROA is net income (oibdpq) divided by book assets (atq).
Q is Tobin's Q, computed as in Kaplan and Zingales (1997) , i.e., measured as the market value of assets, defined as book assets (atq) minus book equity (ceqq) plus market value of equity (cshoq*prccq) minus deferred taxes (txdbq) divided by book assets (atq). Outliers in Tobin's Q are handled by bounding Q above at 10, following the alternative measure of Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003) . Table 1 Summary Statistics
This table presents summary statistics for the sample, which consists of all industrial firms in Compustat's annual files from 1965 to 2006, with non-missing observations on cash for 15 years or more. Cash flow is measured as earnings less interest and taxes, divided by total assets. CAPEX is capital expenditure divided by total assets. STDebt and LTDebt are short-term debt and long-term debt divided by total assets, respectively. Payout is defined as the sum of dividend payments and stock repurchases, divided by book assets. Size is the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets. NWC is net working capital excluding cash, divided by book assets. R&D is research and development expense, divided by total assets, where missing value are set to zero. Acquisitions is acquisition expense, divided by total assets. Net equity issues follows Baker and Wurgler (2002) , and is defined as the difference between the change in book equity and the change in retained earnings. Net debt issues is defined as difference between the change in book assets and the change in book equity. Deficit is the difference between the change in book assets and the change in retained earnings. CF volatility is the industry-level volatility in cash flows over the past 10 years. ROA is net income divided by book assets. Q is Tobin's Q, computed as in Kaplan and Zingales (1997) , i.e., measured as the book value of total assets minus book value of equity plus market value of equity divided by total assets. Outliers in Tobin's Q are handled by bounding Q above at 10, following the alternative measure of Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003) . Table 2 Cash Measures
This table presents summary statistics for the various cash and cash-adjustment related measures. The sample consists of all industrial firms in Compustat's annual files from 1965 to 2006, with non-missing observations on cash for 15 years or more. Cash is cash + short term investments. Target cash is the predicted value from the empirical cash model in Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009) , estimated over a rolling 5-year window [t-5,t-1], which includes lagged cash flow, industry cash flow volatility, Tobin's Q, capital expenditure, debt, a dividend dummy, firm size, net working capital (excluding cash), R&D expenditures, and acquisitions. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. Firm i's unexpected cash at year t is defined as the difference between its target cash and it actual cash ratio at year t. Active is an indicator variable that equals 1 if more than 50% of the change in unexpected cash from year t-1 to year t is due to the change in cash, and 0 if 50% of the change or more is due to the change in target cash. Positive unexpected cash is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm had positive unexpected cash in year t, and 0 otherwise. Away from target is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the absolute distance between the firm's cash ratio and its target ratio was greater than the sample-wide median in year t, and 0 otherwise. Table 2 ). The OLS procedure resembles the procedure to estimate target capital structure in Fama and French (2002) and Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008) , and is defined as follows ( i denotes firm i and t denotes year t):
where: is a vector of control variables following the model in Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009) , which includes lagged cash flow, cash flow volatility, Tobin's Q, capital expenditure, debt, dividend payout dummy, size, net working capital excluding cash, R&D expenditure, and acquisition expenditure. The fixed-effects (FE) procedure resembles the procedure in Flannery and Rangan (2006) , and is defined as follows:
The GMM procedure is similar to the model in Blundell and Bond (1998) , implemented by Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008) . The long differencing (LD) estimator is similar to the one proposed by Hahn, Hausman, and Kuersteiner (2007) and implemented by Huang and Ritter (2009) Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009) , which includes lagged cash flow, industry cash flow volatility, Tobin's Q, capital expenditure, debt, a dividend dummy, firm size, net working capital (excluding cash), R&D expenditures, and acquisitions. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. Target cash is the predicted value from the empirical model in Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009) , estimated over a rolling 5-year window [t-5,t-1] , and unexpected cash is the difference between the firm's actual cash and its implied target cash ratio. Active is an indicator variable that equals 1 if more than 50% of the change in excess cash from year t-1 to year t is due to the change in cash, and 0 if 50% of the change or more is due to the change in optimal cash. The sample consists of all industrial firms in Compustat's annual files from 1965 to 2006, with non-missing observations on cash for 15 years or more. Significance levels are indicated as follows: * = 10%, ** = 5%, *** = 1%. The (2003) corporate governance index, which measures the number of antitakeover provisions in a firm's charter and in the legal code of the state in which the firm is incorporated. In panel B, governance is measured by the percentage of shares held by institutional investors, whereas in Panel C it is measured by the sum of all ownership positions greater than 5% held by institutional investors. For each of these measures, we divide the sample around the median, and code the corresponding halves as poor governance and good governance. The sample consists of all industrial firms in Compustat's annual files from 1965 to 2006, with non-missing observations on cash for 15 years or more. Significance levels are indicated as follows: * = 10%, ** = 5%, *** = 1%. Simulation This table presents estimates from panel regressions explaining firm-level annual cash holdings. In Panel A, the volatilities of cash flow and investment are measured over a 10-year rolling window, whereas in Panel B the volatilities are measured over the entire sample period. In both panels, Column 1 reports regression results for Compustat annual data from 1965 to 2006. Columns 2-4 report regression results for simulated cash paths corresponding to the empirical universe of Compustat firms, where cash flows and capital expenditures are randomly generated to match the joint empirical distribution of cash flows and capital expenditures observed in the data. At time 0, firms are endowed with cash holdings equal to 15% book assets. In each subsequent period, cash holdings change according to the difference between cash flows and capital expenditures that arrive in that period, unless the cash ratio reaches the lower or upper bound, in which case it is rebalanced to the target ratio of 15%, taking into account the expected cash flows and capital expenditures in the next period. We repeat this procedure for each firm in our sample, allowing for different degrees of speed of cash adjustment: 1) Column 1 -Cash interval of [0.14, 0.16] Average unexpected cash of unexpected cash portfolios in event time
The sample consists of all industrial firms in Compustat's annual files from 1965 to 2006, with non-missing observations on cash for 15 years or more. The figure presents the average cash ratio of four portfolios in event time, where year zero is the portfolio formation period. That is, for each calendar year, we form four portfolios by ranking firms based on their unexpected cash (defined below). Holding the portfolios fixed for the next twenty years we compute the average unexpected cash for each portfolio. For example, in 1965 we sort firms into four groups based on the unexpected cash ratios. For each year from 1965 to 1984, we compute the average cash ratio for each of these four portfolios. We repeat this sorting in 1966 and averaging from 1976 to 1985 and so on for every year in our sample horizon. After performing this sorting and averaging for each year from 1965 to 2006, we then average the average cash across "event time" to obtain the lines in the figure. Unexpected cash is defined as the residuals from a cross-sectional regression of cash on the cross-sectional determinants of cash in Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009) , which include lagged cash flow, industry cash flow volatility, Tobin's Q, capital expenditure, debt, a dividend dummy, firm size, net working capital (excluding cash), R&D expenditures, and acquisitions. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. 
Average (detrended) stock repurchases of unexpected cash portfolios in event time
The sample consists of all industrial firms in Compustat's annual files from 1965 to 2006, with non-missing observations on cash for 15 years or more. The figure presents the average stock repurchases to assets ratio of four portfolios in event time, where year zero is the portfolio formation period. That is, for each calendar year, we form four portfolios by ranking firms based on their unexpected cash (defined below). Holding the portfolios fixed for the next twenty years we compute the average stock repurchases to assets ratio for each portfolio. For example, in 1965 we sort firms into four groups based on the unexpected cash ratios. For each year from 1965 to 1984, we compute the average stock repurchases to assets ratio for each of these four portfolios. We repeat this sorting in 1966 and averaging from 1976 to 1985 and so on for every year in our sample horizon. After performing this sorting and averaging for each year from 1965 to 2006, we then average the average stock repurchases to assets ratio across "event time" to obtain the lines in the figure. Unexpected cash is defined as the residuals from a cross-sectional regression of cash on the cross-sectional determinants of cash in Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009) , which include lagged cash flow, industry cash flow volatility, Tobin's Q, capital expenditure, debt, a dividend dummy, firm size, net working capital (excluding cash), R&D expenditures, and acquisitions. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. 
